Abstract Historically, the US Supreme Court has been the federal branch most highly regarded by the public on almost every measure. However, recent polling suggests that there may have been an unprecedented drop in support for the Court over the past decade. I examine this downturn in the context of historical trends in public opinion of the Court, finding that while there does appear to be an appreciable decline, there does not appear to be a single clear causal factor or series of events responsible, and that the decline has not persisted long enough to represent a real sea change to date. In contrast to formal and informal academic assessments, controversial appointments and ideologically charged decisions do not appear to influence substantially the public's evaluations of the Court. Prevailing trends in opinion on the other branches of government, however, do appear to have an influence. Additionally, strong, consistent support for a political confirmation process emerged, suggesting that the public sees the Court as a political body with the justices as self-interested actors, rather than a strictly impartial legal entity.
its decisions (Bartels and Johnson 2013) . Have controversial decisions, contentious confirmation processes, or the increase of partisan agenda items on its docket undermined support for the Court, or is it simply a victim of a wave of generalized anti-government sentiment? This article evaluates these various possibilities by examining the trends in public opinion concerning different characteristics of the Court: its general approval, ideology, confidence, Chief Justice, and politicization.
The Supreme Court has appeared on several long-running surveys since the 1970s, though with a limited number of consistently repeated questions regarding it. This allows for long-term analysis of issues such as confidence and approval but provides less information about other aspects of the Court, such as the appointment process and the justices' ideology. Though these aspects are certainly of interest, the more general nature of the long-running questions may be due to the varying levels of salience those more specific issues have across time. The public's awareness of specific justices or decisions has a narrow window. Questions about them are often only asked just prior to or after a confirmation process or opinion announcement, leading to few if any trends being available. As a result, other trend analyses that utilize information about the Court tend to be subject specific, rather than institution specific, and focus on ongoing social issues, such as Shaw (2007) 
General Approval
The Supreme Court mostly enjoyed at least slight majority approval of its job performance from 2000 to about 2011, when its approval percentage dropped to less than 50 percent, where it has remained since in most polls. From 2000 to 2003, Gallup consistently found strong majorities (around 60 percent) approving of how the Court handled itself (table 1) . 1 However, in the past four years, approval has ranged between 43 and 49 percent. In the intervening years, ratings fluctuated between a high of 61 percent in 2009 and a low of 42 percent in 2005, but did not exhibit a trend long-lasting enough to counteract the general trend toward lower approval. An identical CNN/ORC question found slightly higher approval ratings, with a small increase in approval in the summer of 2012, but also a decrease from 2012 to 2013 (table 2) . Though the increase could be explained by the decision in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (the first Affordable Care Act case) that year, in comparison, Gallup polls reported no difference between approval levels in fall 2011 and summer 2012 (table 1). Levels of approval for the CNN/ORC polls returned to above 50 percent in 2015 without any particular decisionrelated attention drawn to the Court, further suggesting that the decrease is not indicative of a trend. The same question asked by CBS News/New York Times resulted in fairly consistent approval levels over 2012-2013 as well as in 2015, though with slightly lower than those reported by Gallup and CNN (table 3) . This might be due to the higher levels of uncertainty ("unsure" or "don't know/ no answer" responses) deflating results. When the same question was posed to registered voters, approval percentages were generally in the mid-to high 40s, with an isolated increase in 2009 (table 4) . This increase is consistent with a similar isolated increase in 2009 from the Gallup polls, even though Gallup's population of interest was more general.
The trend when asking about favorability is similar to the trend in approval ratings. In 2001, as high as 72 percent of Americans had a "very/mostly favorable" opinion of the Court, but by the summer of 2012 the percentage had fallen to 51 and remained in that range (table 5) . Ratings of favorability tend to be higher than ratings of approval, perhaps because the question's very general wording seemed to indicate a focus on the institution rather than job performance. Though the approval measure could be read more generally, results from an open-ended follow-up question to Gallup's approval question in May 2007 suggest that many respondents understood it as a performance question. However, among those who approved of the Court's job performance, the proportion citing approval of its decisions as the reason for their approval was similar to the proportion with no reason in particular. This suggests that while approval is often linked to output, it may also be significantly influenced by an instinctual respect for the Court as an institution apart from its rulings.
Confidence
Confidence in the Supreme Court has historically been both comparatively high and relatively stable throughout time. Lipset and Schneider (1983, 67-76) found that the Court was consistently the highest-ranked government body across a number of polls through the 1960s and 1970s, easily weathering the effects of Watergate and Vietnam that affected confidence in other organizations. The Court appears to have lost some of that immunity in recent years. However, the severity of this trend depends on how confidence is being measured. Confidence in "the people running" the Supreme Court remained fairly stable for many years but has recently trended downward (table 6). Since the 1970s, about 30 percent of the public reports having a "great deal" of confidence, 50 percent having "only some," and between 10 and 20 percent "very little" under this formulation. Based on the GSS, the percentage of those with a "great deal" of confidence declined slowly from 33 to 29 percent between 2006 and 2012, with a sharp drop to 23 percent in 2014. This is the longest measured period of sustained decline, wrapping up with the lowest recorded level of confidence since 1973. The previous lowest point was 25 percent in 1980, but ratings rose back to their former levels by the mid-1980s. The appearance of a low point after the "national malaise" of the Carter administration suggests that ratings were influenced by a general lack of confidence in the government, rather than specific concerns with the Court. All three branches hit then-historic lows for confidence during the period (Lipset and Schneider 1983, 52-53) . Similarly, the current trend for the Court is consistent with declines in confidence (of different degrees) for the president and Congress over the past decade ("Confidence in Institutions"). However, it remains to be seen whether the declines will persist or if opinion will drift back upward as it did post-1980. The results from the Harris surveys follow the same general pattern of declining confidence in the early 2000s, from 34 percent with a great deal of confidence in 2000 to 25 percent in 2008, but with more variability over the whole period (table 7) . After declining, the percentage with a great deal of confidence increased six percentage points between 2008 and 2010. Gallup and CBS more directly measured confidence in the institution (tables 8 and 9). As identified in Lipset and Schneider (1983, 57) , the standard used by Gallup (and others) of using four rather than three answer choices generally results in higher reported confidence levels, which makes it more difficult to compare directly. Though the difference in wording-specifying the institution rather than the people-may seem also to be a contributing factor to the discrepancy, Lipset and Schneider (1983, 93) find that it has very little, if any, impact on the results. When combining those with a "great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence, institutional confidence appears to be consistently higher than confidence in the institution's leaders, but has also declined much more significantly from as high as 54 percent in 1986 to 30 percent in 2014. The decrease has been reflected in the increase of the percentage with "very little" confidence, rather than just an increase in those with "some" confidence.
Despite these trends, a crisis in Court legitimacy does not appear imminent. Table 8 . Continued Sinozichconfidence, suggesting that a decline in confidence in government or institutions overall might be responsible, rather than any specific aspects of the Court (Gallup Organization n.d.). Confidence has also been criticized as a noncomprehensive measure of legitimacy. Gibson, Caldiera, and Spence (2003) suggest that it does a poor job of measuring "diffuse support," finding that the public remains strongly loyal to the Court as an institution, even as specific support-"satisfaction in general with the outputs of the institution"-varies.
Ideology
Measures of the Court's ideology under a given set of justices are typically calculated either through aggregating the justices' votes on cases with a variety of ideological slants (Martin and Quinn 2002) or trying independently to divine their personal ideologies (Segal and Cover 1989) . The public's impression of the prevailing ideology of the Court is difficult to pin down because of the various and inconsistent ways it is measured, and the resulting differences in results. Gallup finds that the perceived ideology is mostly independent of both the justices and their decisions (table 10) . Instead, recent trends appear to be tied to the public's perception of ideological trends in government overall. During the Obama administration, approximately 30 percent thought the "current Supreme Court" was too liberal, and between 19 and 24 percent thought it was too conservative. Neither the appointment of a new justice (Elena Kagan) nor the decision in the 2012 ACA case appeared to have a significant impact on this rating. (Any effect from the appointment of Sonia Sotomayor would be combined with the effect of the 2008 election, but given that 2009 appears consistent with the other Obama years, it does not appear to be a factor on its own.) During the Bush administration's second term, the situation is flipped, with between 30 and 25 percent considering the Court too conservative, and 21 to 25 percent considering it too liberal. Between 39 and 50 percent considered the Court "about right" throughout the period. This trend of "backlash" in opinion on the Court against ideological changes in the executive branch suggests the Court is perceived as being tied to the greater body of the federal government in the public mind. First, the public possibly conflates the Court with the administration it operates alongside, even when the administration's actions do not directly affect the Court's membership or output. For example, 21 percent of the public considered the Supreme Court "too liberal" between September 2006 and September 2008, but this increased to 28 percent in the summer of 2009 and remained higher through the Obama administration (table 10) . Second, the trends are quite comparable to the thermostatic nature of public opinion on other government-related issues, such as spending (Soroka and Wlezien 2010, 41-42) . Despite this, when asked about the ideological tenor of its decisions, rather than the Court overall, this presidential trend does not appear (table 11 ).
An event-based effect does appear, but only under specific circumstances: limiting the question to two answer choices ("too liberal/conservative," no middle option given), and asking about "decisions." Under these conditions, opinion does appear to be influenced by events involving the Court that signaled a liberal turn (table 12) . In 2012, 33 percent of voters thought the Court was too liberal, though an almost equal share also believed it was too conservative (35 percent). This shifted in 2013, after the polarizing Affordable Care Act decision in June 2012, with 40 percent now believing the Court was too liberal. Though this is only one instance, it suggests that people are paying attention, and that when forced to make a decision, they are using that salient information. That said, a greater percentage also believed it was too conservative in 2013, though this effect does not appear for registered voters when a middle option is given, suggesting limited generalizability (table 13). There is a potential question-wording effect from using "too liberal/ conservative" rather than a straight evaluation of the Court's position. The public may find the Court "liberal" or "conservative" but within acceptable boundaries, and be put off by the question. Pew surveys found that under the Obama administration, when asked about the ideology of the current court, approximately 40 percent considered it "middle of the road," with approximately equal percentages considering it liberal or conservative (table 14) . For the one measurement under the Bush administration, much more of the public (36 percent), but still a minority, rated the Court conservative. This question's results did not exhibit event-based effects. However, it is unclear whether the variation that appeared in the questions that used "too" in their wordings is real or the result of respondents attempting to find cues-such as the ideology of the current administration-to help them answer the question as asked. 
Chief Justice John Roberts
Given their relative lack of exposure and Americans' general political illiteracy, it is no surprise that specific justices-particularly recent arrivals-are not household names to the public. Even five years after his appointment, only 28 percent were able to correctly identify John Roberts as the Chief Justice out of a list with two former justices (Thurgood Marshall and John Paul Stevens, who retired the same year) and then-Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (table 15) . After significant media coverage of the Court and Roberts's majority opinion in the 2012 Affordable Care Act decision (NFIB v. Sebelius), recognition increased to (table 17) , approval appears to have risen over the same period, from 48 to 55 percent. (Some of this increase may have been assisted by the placement of the 2013 Roberts rating question among questions about significantly less popular political leaders.) Both suggest greater popularity for Roberts over that of the Court, even if the trend is unclear. Since those who register to vote do tend to differ from the general public demographically (and possibly ideologically), it is not particularly surprising that there is a difference here (see Leighley and Nagler [2014] ). However, the similar levels of "don't know/no opinion" responses indicate that even those who are more politically inclined are unsure as to how to evaluate the chief justice's work.
Politicization
Traditionally, scholars have assumed that the public sees the Court as "above politics," due to some combination of the tone of media coverage and the efforts of the justices themselves to avoid being perceived as traditional political actors (Lipset and Schneider 1983, 69; Baird and Gangl 2006) . Though the justices are unlikely to change tack, the media now scrutinize the machinations of justices' decision-making. Just after the 2012 ACA decision was announced, media outlets speculated on the process that brought about the somewhat unanticipated opinion, including the justices' own concerns about losing legitimacy (Crawford 2012) . The importance of the decision to partisan political agendas undoubtedly also contributed to the politicized nature of media coverage. Thus, it seems unlikely that the public would continue to perceive the Court in strictly apolitical terms, assuming they did in the first place. supermajority of the public in recent years believes that the justices' personal and political views factor into their decision-making (table 19) . Given this belief, the public seems to be rationally responding to an existing situationthat the process is influenced by non-legal factors-by expanding the scope of inquiry to include relevant information. This is consistent with cross-sectional studies (Bartels and Johnston 2012) . That the percentage of those who believe that the justices only use legal analysis was higher in 2012 than 2013 may be due to the salience of the controversial (and highly ideological) ACA decision during this period. Though the 2012 poll was taken before the announcement, significant coverage of the case and its relation to the justices' personal beliefs and ideologies may have influenced the public's conceptualization of the process at that moment in time.
Conclusion
Measuring opinion about the Court is difficult for a number of reasons, not the least of which is the public's own uncertainty. However, there are also methodological impediments. Differences in question wording affect the validity of comparing the various measurements, as evidenced by systematic differences in trends. This was an issue for analyzing confidence in and ideology of the Court. Organizations may want to stick to the same questions in order to create comparable series, or because they have been previously tested and validated. However, it is important that they be clear about what the question actually ends up measuring-whether it is an aspect of the institution, its leadership, or other characteristics-and to not force opinions when it is unclear that they exist. That said, the existing body of questions does allow for some interesting considerations of measurement and wording effects, resulting in (hopefully) more accurate conclusions. Perhaps because the Court rarely takes part in directly public-facing endeavors, public perceptions of various aspects of the Court seem to be influenced by a wide variety of factors, from the decisions handed down to the general ideological atmosphere in Washington, DC. Though conclusions about public opinion on the Court's ideology, the Chief Justice, and increasing politicization are difficult to draw, approval and confidence in the Court do both appear to be trending down. This does not appear to be the result of specific events such as appointments or decisions related to the Court. To what degree does this matter? On its face, it seems as though the Court's reputation is sliding, and it can do nothing about it. Despite this, the public retains its loyalty and thus (by most scholars' formulation) the Court retains its legitimacy. One way in which this is manifested is in the Court's reciprocal influence on opinions toward policy (Christenson and Glick 2015) .
What is clear is that Americans today, if they didn't before, understand the Court as a body within the political sphere. They see decisions as political events and see the justices as political (that is, self-interested and strategic) actors. Thus, the legitimacy does not seem to stem from some sense of the Court as a disassociated institution on a hill from which enlightened, purely legal, opinions emanate. Though the public may have a more or less sophisticated understanding of where the Court falls relative to the president or Congress, it does seem to associate the three. Given that opinion of the Court was not significantly affected by any number of scandals affecting Congress and the presidency prior to the 2000s, this may reflect the new media environment and the mood of political reporting since then (Baird and Gangl 2006) . What would be the impact of a long-term slide in approval? Will the "reservoir of goodwill" be drained? Only time-and careful monitoring of the trends-will tell.
